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By Nancy E. Landahl and L. Lee Schmidt, Jr.
The courts commonly distinguish 
between licensing statutes that are 
regulatory in character and those 
which are enacted merely to raise 
revenue. A regulatory statute is one 
designed for the protection of the 
public against unqualified persons. 
The object of such a statute, then, is 
to promote the public welfare by per­
mitting only persons with the 
necessary qualifications to receive 
the license.
Over the years, a principle of law 
has been fairly well established that 
groups licensed for regulatory pur­
poses have been allowed to estab­
lish their own rules of conduct and 
standards of performance that must 
be followed in the conduct of the 
work for which the license was 
granted. While Certified Public Ac­
countants perform many varied 
types of service to the public, the 
only service for which the CPA is 
uniquely licensed is the performance 
of an audit.
The profession, in section 110.01 
of the Statements on Auditing Stand­
ards, defined the purpose of an audit 
as:
The objective of the ordinary 
examination of financial state­
ments by the independent audi­
tor is the expression of an opin­
ion on the fairness with which 
they present financial position 
in conformity with generally ac­
cepted accounting principles. 
The auditor’s report is the 
medium through which he ex­
presses his opinion or, if cir­
cumstances require, disclaims 
an opinion.
Since Certified Public Account­
ants are licensed through the 
auspices of regulatory statutes and 
exist for the purpose of promoting 
the public welfare, it seems ap­
propriate to inquire into the percep­
tions of an auditor’s duty as seen by 
that public. This paper addresses the 
question of what the public expects 
from auditors.
Many different groups have at­
tempted to speak for the “public” 
as the following paragraphs will 
suggest.
The opinion handed down in the 
1136 Tenants Corporation case had 
four points that were made in the 
decision that are very important to 
practicing CPAs (the decision was 
upheld by the New York Supreme 
Court):
1. A write-up engagement re­
quires certain definitive audit 
procedures.
2. Hiring a CPA presumes an 
audit.
3. An audit may be adequately 
performed without independent 
verification.
4. Accountants have a duty to 
detect defalcation.
All four of these points in the deci­
sion were very disquieting to the pro­
fession. The first three points can be, 
and are, being adequately dealt with 
by authoritative pronouncements 
which insure that, when adhered to, 
the CPA can effectively limit possi­
ble liability through “sound prac­
tices.” Points one and two, for in­
stance, can be dealt with by having 
an adequately constructed engage­
ment letter. The Parol Evidence Rule 
will not allow oral testimony to con­
tradict what is present in a written 
contract. Thus, if the engagement 
letter says clearly that no audit is in­
tended, it would be difficult if not im­
possible for the client to say that an 
audit was contemplated. Point three 
also could be dealt with through the 
engagement letter and the new 
categories of service — Compilation 
and Review — should clearly delin­
eate the fact that CPAs can and do 
provide different levels of service 
that are in the general area of the 
attest function. Point four, however, 
presents more of a problem since it 
addresses a duty of a professional 
that is licensed to promote the public 
welfare.
In the Equity Funding case, nine­
teen or more members of top corpo­
rate management perpetrated a 
massive fraud. The fraudulent ac­
tivities were: 1) creation and infla­
tion of assets, 2) borrowing cash 
without recording a liability, and 3) 
creation of phony insurance 
policies. The auditors failed to detect 
the fraud. The failure to adhere to 
generally accepted auditing stand­
ards was held to be gross neg­
ligence on the part of the auditors. 
Fraud, as defined by the courts, must 
usually include a willful intent to 
defraud; but in Equity Funding the 
courts held that the gross negli­
gence of the auditors was equivalent 
to fraud. Thus, the auditors were 
found guilty of being a party to the is­
suance of false financial statements 
and were sentenced to jail terms.
In both the Equity Funding and 
1136 Tenants’ Corporation cases, 
the courts found that the auditors 
should have detected the frauds; 
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however, the Supreme Court 
reached an opposite conclusion in 
Hochfelder. The fraud was perpe­
trated by the president of the First 
Securities Company of Chicago. The 
president diverted funds for his own 
use which customers of the company 
had given him. The checks were 
made out and addressed to the 
president. The president had a “mail 
rule” which said that all mail ad­
dressed to him was to be opened 
only by him. The auditors did not in­
vestigate the “mail rule” and they 
did not discover the fraud. The fraud 
was disclosed by the president in a 
suicide note. The defrauded 
customers sued the auditors for 
negligence under Rule 10b-5. The 
court, however, found the auditors 
were not guilty under the 10b-5 
reasoning that mere negligence 
does not constitute fraud on the part 
of the auditor. Mere negligence is 
the failure to exercise ordinary care 
in the performance of a duty, while 
gross negligence is the failure to 
exercise even slight care.
The Supreme Court, in their ruling 
on the Hochfelder case, did not at­
tempt to define public policy by 
defining or limiting the liability to the 
public accountant for failing to 
detect fraud. In a footnote to the 
opinion, the court did cite the 
Ultramares decision but did not use 
Ultramares to further explain its 
reasoning. In Ultramares, Cardozo 
gave this opinion on the auditor’s 
liability for negligence:1
If liability for negligence exists, 
a thoughtless slip or blunder, 
the failure to detect a theft or 
forgery beneath the cover of 
deceptive entries, may expose 
accountants to a liability in an 
indeterminate amount for an in­
determinate time to an indeter­
minate class.
These court cases indicate that 
the judiciary is not yet ready to 
clearly define how much respon­
sibility the auditor should have for 
the decision of fraud. The 
Hochfelder decision simply stated 
that mere negligence on the part of 
the auditor is not fraud. The court did 
not state whether compliance by au­
ditors with the standards of the pro­
fession is sufficient to prevent the 
auditor from becoming liable for fail­
ing to detect fraud.
The informed investor is ap­
parently not satisfied with the posi­
tion the profession has taken on the 
detection of fraud. A 1975 survey2 
(taken before SAS 16 was issued) 
surveyed corporate financial man­
agers, bankers, and financial 
analysts. Those surveyed felt that 
auditors had a substantially higher 
responsibility to detect material 
fraud than auditors felt they had. 
While auditors felt that their respon­
sibility for fraud detection should be 
lessened, the informed investors felt 
that the responsibility for the detec­
tion of fraud should be increased. In 
another survey, two-thirds of the 
shareholders surveyed felt that the 
certified public accountant’s most 
important function was to detect sig­
nificant fraud. This survey was also 
taken before SAS 16 was issued.3 
Since these surveys were taken 
before the issuance of SAS 16, they 
may not reflect the feelings of in­
formed investors currently.
In 1974 the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants estab­
lished a Commission of Auditor’s 
Responsibilities, commonly known 
as the Cohen Commission. The for­
mation of the Cohen Commission 
was an attempt on the part of the In­
stitute to respond to criticism about 
the auditing profession. The final 
report of the Commission was issued 
in 1978. The Cohen Commission 
concluded that significant percen­
tages of financial statement users 
consider fraud detection one of the 
most important objectives of an 
audit. The Commission said that 
although in its early years the ac­
counting profession had recognized 
the importance of detecting fraud, 
this recognition had declined in re­
cent years. The Cohen Commission 
concluded that the audit should pro­
vide reasonable assurance that the 
financial statements were not 
affected by material fraud. The audi­
tor has a duty search for fraud and is 
expected to detect fraud by the exer­
cise of professional skill and care.
In an apparent response to per­
ceived public pressure, the following 
pronouncement was made a part of 
the Statements on Auditing Stand­
ards in 1978:
Under generally accepted 
auditing standards, the inde­
pendent auditor has the 
responsibility, within the in­
herent limitations of the audit­
ing process, to plan his ex­
amination to search for errors
The high percentage of 
investors who never read the 
auditor’s opinion is 
disquieting.
or irregularities that would have 
a material effect on the finan­
cial statements and to exercise 
due skill and care in the con­
duct of that examination.
The Senate Subcommittee on 
Reports, Accounting and Manage­
ment, otherwise known as the Met­
calf Committee, generally endorses 
the recommendations of the Cohen 
Commission. Specifically, the Met­
calf Committee said:4
The Cohen Commission recom­
mended several reforms in the 
way auditors for publicly owned 
corporations perform their 
responsibilities. The recom­
mendations were based on a 
reaffirmation of the auditor’s 
function, which the commission 
said is to protect the public’s in­
terest against “biases, errors, 
and misrepresentations, includ­
ing material frauds and illegal 
or questionable acts.’’
In a similar but perhaps stronger 
statement, the Securities and Ex­
change Commission (SEC) has ex­
pressed the opinion that auditors 
should take more responsibility for 
detecting fraud. In 1974, John C. 
Burton said:
“Nineteen seventy-four might 
be called the year of the audi­
tor. The historical position of 
the auditor, which seems to be 
that fraud is not what the CPA is 
responsible for finding has to 
be reconsidered. We have seen 
too many cases of management 
fraud where management has 
obscured the reality of the 
corporate activity from the 
auditor.”5
Former SEC Chairman Harold 
Williams, demonstrated agreement 
with Burton when he said about the 
Cohen Commission:
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“I believe the Commission is 
saying that we can’t expect the 
auditors to discover every man­
agement effort to defraud, 
deceive or conceal, but that the 
obligation to search is greater 
than accountants have 
historically admitted and that 
the obligation to disclose find­
ings is greater than auditors 
have anticipated.”6
The SEC thus believes that the 
purpose of the independent auditor 
is not only to give an opinion on the 
fairness of presentation of financial 
statements but also to make an effort 
to detect fraud. The SEC evidently 
believes that fraud detection is an 
objective which the profession 
should espouse in order to serve the 
public interest.
The courts, the AICPA, the SEC, 
and other advisory type groups are 
imputing or recommending respon­
sibilities on the auditor for detecting 
fraud based upon their perception of 
what the public expects an audit to 
be. Since the expectations of the 
public are such a driving force, an 
effort was made to determine, at 
least in one locale, what these 
expectations are.
The technique which was used 
was somewhat unique for a survey of 
this type. Rather than a mail ques­
tionnaire, a telephone survey was 
undertaken. A significant cloud of 
doubt is frequently cast over mail 
surveys by persons who speculate 
about the motives of those polled 
who return the questionnaires. 
Typically, mail surveys have a low 
response rate which requires a large 
sample in order to obtain sufficient 
usable replies. In the present survey, 
a 100 percent response rate was 
achieved because of using the 
telephone; therefore the question of 
the respondent’s motivation should 
not arise.
The Survey
The objective of the survey was to 
determine what four different groups 
of people surveyed perceived to be 
the primary purpose of the independ­
ent auditor. The groups chosen 
were: financial analysts, account­
ants who were not CPAs, managers 
and the general public. The popula­
tion was the metropolitan Denver 
area. This area was chosen because 
about half the population of the state 
of Colorado resides in Denver. It was 
felt that the views of the people of the 
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Denver area would probably reflect 
the views of Coloradoans as a 
whole, though not necessarily the 
views of the people of the United 
States. The results of the 1970 cen­
sus were used to determine the size 
of the population and of the groups 
within the population. While the 
population of Denver has increased 
in size since 1970, the census figures 
were the best available and were 
therefore used to compute the sam­
ple size. A statistician was consulted 
to assure that the survey would be as 
unbiased as possible and to help es­
tablish the sample size and evaluate 
the results of the survey.
Telephone calls were made until 
the predetermined number of people 
within each group had been sur­
veyed. Some bias may exist in the 
survey in that not all the residents of 
Denver have telephones. The effect 
of this type of bias on the survey is 
probably minor. The response rate 
on the survey was 100 percent since 
calls were continued until the pre­
determined sample size was 
reached.
The questionnaire was designed 
to be brief and unbiased. Brevity was 
necessary because people con­
tacted by telephone often do not 
wish to respond to a long survey. 
The questions were designed to give 
some background of those surveyed 
as well as to determine the amount 
of exposure they had to auditing. 
The primary objective of the survey 
was to determine what the four 
groups surveyed perceive to be the 
primary purpose of the independent 
auditor.
The results of the survey were 
evaluated by using the Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences com­
puter program. Cross tabulations 
were performed on the data, as well 
as the Chi Square test. Those results 
which had a level of significance of 
less than .10 were considered 
statistically significant and therefore 
acceptable.
The Questionnaire
1. Which of the following most 





2. Which of the following most 
clearly reflects your level of 
education?





3. Do you own stocks in any com­
panies which are audited by inde­
pendent auditors?
4. If the answer to 3 was yes, do you 
generally examine the informa­
tion contained in the financial 
statements, including the audi­
tor’s opinion?
5. Have you ever worked for a com­
pany which was audited by an in­
dependent auditor?
6. In your understanding, which of 
the following most clearly de­
scribes the primary purpose of the 
independent auditor?
a. to detect fraud or theft by 
employees and/or manage­
ment
b. to give an opinion on whether 
or not the financial statements 
as a whole are fairly presented
c. to check to see if every trans­
action a business had during a 
year is recorded properly
d. other — explain
7. Of the four statements in the pre­
vious question, which do you feel 
should be the primary purpose of 
the independent auditor?
In Table I, the results of the survey 
are broken down by perception of 
the independent auditor’s primary 
purpose and occupation of those 
who responded.
The first thing noted from the 
results of the survey is that a rela­
tively small percentage of all the 
groups perceive the primary pur­
pose of the independent auditor to 
be fraud detection. This is in sharp 
contrast to what is generally 
believed to be the perception of the 
public. Secondly, the table shows 
that those surveyed who have had 
more exposure to auditing because 
of the nature of their occupation 
have (as would be expected) a better 
idea of the auditor’s primary purpose 
than those with little exposure. 
Thirdly, for the general public, a high 
percentage of respondents perceive 
the independent auditor’s primary 
purpose to be check all transactions. 
The second highest percentage 
category were those who perceive
the purpose of an audit to be the fair 
presentation of financial statements. 
These percentages indicate that, 
though a significant percentage of 
the general public understand what 
an auditor does, there is still an ob­
vious lack of communication of the 
objective of an audit to the general 
public.
In order for the accounting profes­
sion to serve the public interest, it is 
necessary that the accountant’s end 
product, the financial statement, be 
useful to the public. Some interest­
ing statistics were obtained in this 
survey about stockholders and the 
audited financial statements which 
some companies issue (see ques­
tions 3 & 4 of the questionnaire). Of 
the persons surveyed, 35.3 percent 
owned stock in companies which 
issue audited financial statements. 
Of these stockholders only 36.6 per­
cent often read the financial state­
ments, including the auditor’s opin­
ion. Those stockholders who some­
times read the financial statements 
and the auditor’s opinion were 14.6 
percent of those stockholders sur­
veyed. The stockholders who did not 
read the financial statements con­
stituted 48.8 percent of those sur­
veyed. This high percentage of peo­
ple who seldom or never read the fi­
nancial statements and the auditor’s 
opinion is disquieting.
The survey also questioned re­
spondents about their perception of 
what should be the primary purpose 
of the independent auditor. These 
results are presented in Table II. 
The answers in the other column in­
cluded “don’t know” and “give ad­
vice” but were too varied to classify 
further.
Of those in the first and third 
groups listed, a majority felt that the 
auditor’s primary purpose should be 
to give an opinion on the fairness of 
financial statement presentation. 
Those in the general public and non­
stockholder groups expressed more 
fragmented views on what should be 
the primary purpose of an audit. For 
all groups, detecting fraud was rated 
lowest as the primary purpose of an 
audit.
The results of a cross-tabulation of 
the level of education of the person 
surveyed with their perception of the 
primary purpose of the independent 
auditor are presented in Table III. In 
the category titled “Other” the 
answers include “give advice,”
Occupation
Financial Non CPA General
Perception Analyst Manager Accountant Public
% % % %
Detect fraud 0 7.7 14.2 17.9
Fairly presents 80.0 53.8 64.3 34.5
Check every transaction 0 23.1 14.3 40.5
Don’t know 0 0 0 6.0
Give advice 0 7.7 0 1.2
Other 20.0 7.7 7.1 0
Table I
Perception of What Should Be 
the Primary Purpose of the 
Independent Auditor
Detect Fairly Check All
Classification Fraud Presents Transactions Other
Financial Analysts,
% % % %
Accountants & Mgrs. 6.3 56.3 21.9 15.6
General Public 14.3 26.2 39.3 20.2
Stockholders 7.3 53.7 29.3 9.8











% % % % %
high school 38.5 7.7 38.5 15.4 11.2
High school 9.4 31.3 50.0 9.4 27.6
Some college 
Undergraduate
20.7 41.4 31.0 6.9 25.0
degree 
Graduate
6.1 57.6 27.3 9.1 28.4
degree 22.2 77.8 — — 7.8
Totals 15.5 42.2 33.6 8.6 100.0
Table III
“don’t know,” and answers which 
did not fit into the other three catego­
ries. There seems to be a definite in­
crease in the proportion of those 
who correctly perceive the auditor’s 
primary purpose according to the in­
crease in the level of education. 
However, there is not a clear 
decrease in the proportion of those 
who believe auditors detect fraud 
according to the increase in the level 
of education.
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Conclusions
The first conclusion which may be 
drawn is that more research on the 
perceptions and desires of the users 
of financial statements is needed. If 
financial statement users do not find 
the information contained in the fi­
nancial statements understandable 
and useful, the auditing profession is 
failing to properly serve the public 
interest. If Congress and the SEC are 
overemphasizing the need for 
greater efforts to detect fraud, the 
desires of the financial statement 
users are being misinterpreted. The 
goal of the profession should be to 
satisfy the desires of financial state­
ment users, not the desires of 
governmental bodies. The auditing 
profession should also be con­
cerned that the financial statement 
users understand the objective of an 
audit. An understanding of the infor­
mation contained in the financial 
statements must be accompanied by 
an understanding of the auditor’s 
report. The possibilities discussed 
above indicate a need for more 
research in this area on a nation­
wide scale.
Secondly, this study focused on 
the perception of the primary pur­
pose of an audit. Further work 
should be done to determine a rank 
ordering of various sub-purposes of 
an audit including the types of fraud 
that are of most importance to state­
ment users.
Thirdly, the profession should at­
tempt to enlighten the public about 
the objectives of the independent au­
ditor and the meaning of the infor­
mation contained in the financial 
statements. There are several possi­
ble solutions for this problem. One is 
an educational program conducted 
by the profession. Such a campaign 
could be conducted in the schools or 
in the media or both. Another 
possibility is to have all audited fi­
nancial statements contain a state­
ment like the following: “For assist­
ance in interpreting these state­
ments, take them to a qualified pro­
fessional.” A third possibility is to 
expressly state in the auditor’s 
report that the opinion is based upon 
the results of testing and sampling. 
Solutions like those above could 
help to clarify the meaning of the in­
formation in the financial statements 
for the public.
Finally, the profession should es­
tablish well-defined standards on 
the auditor’s responsibility for the 
detection of fraud. Auditors need a 
standard against which their per­
formance can be measured to deter­
mine the degree of negligence, if 
any, which exists when the auditor 
fails to detect material fraud. If the 
profession does not set standards in 
this area, the courts will set stand­
ards for the profession on a case by 
case basis.Ω
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